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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellant is the Idaho Transportation Department. Appellant may hereafter be referred
to as "ITD" or "the Department".

Respondent is Ascorp, Inc. d/b/a Debco Construction.

Respondent may hereafter be referred to as "Debco". The Parties are engaged in a dispute
related to amounts rightfully due and owing under a highway construction contract. Debco filed
a formal claim on October 28, 2013 to seek recovery of additional amounts claimed due. Such
filing was in accord with ITD's administrative claim review process that is contained in the
Department's Standard Specifications for Highway Construction. However, on the very next
day, October 29, 2013, Debco submitted an arbitration demand in direct contravention of the
administrative claim appeal process.

Respondent's actions to initiate premature arbitration

severely impaired ITD's ability to do a thorough claim analysis so as to mitigate or perhaps
completely resolve the contract claim.
To protect the administrative claims process, the Department brought suit in district court
to seek declaratory and injunctive relief related to the timing of arbitration vis-a-vis the claim
procedures. This is an appeal from (i) a Civil Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal that was granted by
District Court Judge Steven J. Hippler, and (ii) an award of attorneys' fees and costs made
subsequent to said dismissal. The Department asserts that both decisions were erroneous and it
requests that this Court correct such mistakes.
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B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Respondent Debco filed its claim for additional contract monies with the Department on
October 28, 2013. (R. 000048 - 000050).
One day later, on October 29, 2013, Debco filed an arbitration demand with the
American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). (R. 000052 - 000107).
So as to avoid any waiver per the AAA Construction Arbitration Rules, ITD was forced
to respond to the arbitration demand on November 21, 2013, and to also file a motion to stay
arbitration pending the contractually-required exhaustion of ITD's administrative claim review
process. (R. 000109 - 000129).
Debco opposed the Department's motion on November 22, 2013, and requested that
AAA proceed with administration of the matter. (R. 000133).
AAA (Michael Powell) emailed the parties' counsel on November 22, 2013, and stated
that "Absent mutual agreement or court order, the Association shall proceed with the
administration of the matter." (R. 000131; emphasis added).
On December 2, 2013, Debco filed a motion with AAA to request that a briefing
schedule be set and that an arbitration date be scheduled. (R. 000135 - 000138).
In response to the actions of Debco and the suggestions of AAA, ITD filed a December
10, 2013 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief with the Fourth Judicial
District Court in Ada County. (R. 000005 - 000138).
On January 23, 2014, AAA scheduled a preliminary hearing for February 5, 2014, and
requested initial payment from the parties by or before January 31, 2014. (R. 000319-000323).
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Given the pending AAA hearing, ITD filed motions on January 27, 2014 for a Temporary
Restraining Order ("TRO") (R. 000311 - 000312) and a preliminary injunction (R. 000313 000314) (the preliminary injunction was scheduled to be heard at a February 10, 2014 hearing).
On January 28, 2014, Debco filed a TRO opposition and told the court that it had paid both
parties' AAA fees. (R. 000353 - 000356).
The district court declined ITD's requested TRO on January 30, 2014, concluding that
Debco' s payment of AAA fees removed pending harm.

This occurred via a telephonic

conference and it is believed that no transcript or written order exists.
AAA continued with its preliminary hearing on February 5, 2014. However, at that time,
the panel declined to schedule a full arbitration hearing to consider the actual merits of Debco' s
claim. Granted the requested time by AAA, ITD withdrew its February 10, 2014 motion for a
preliminary injunction. (R. 000466 - 000467).
On February 10, 2014, the district court-after being apprised of AAA's delay in
arbitration scheduling-granted Debco' s request for a Civil Rule 12(b)( 6) dismissal (written
order from the court was issued on February 21, 2014). (R. 000468 - 000469).
Debco filed a Memorandum of Costs and Fees on February 21, 2014. (R. 000472 000483). Despite ITD's objection, the district court awarded fees and discretionary costs on
May 12, 2014. (R. 000516- 000517).
ITD timely appealed the district court's dismissal and the award of attorneys' fees and
costs. (R. 000497 - 000500) and (R. 000524 - 000527).
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C.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. Contract Structure, Claim Process And Dispute Resolution Provisions

In May of 2010, Respondent submitted a proposal to Appellant ITD whereby Debco
would reconstruct a portion of Washington Street in the City of Twin Falls, Idaho (hereafter
"Washington Street project"). Said proposal by Debco was in the form of a unit price bid in the
amount of $6,531,483.40. The pricing proposal can be found in the Amended Clerk's Record on
Appeal filed on July 10, 2014, Exhibit A to ITD's initial Complaint (R. 000016 - 000028). The
Washington Street project was to be a local road project administered by ITD.
On or about June 3, 2010, ITD and Debco entered into a contract for the Washington
Street project. The contract is identified as ITD Contract No. 7418. Lonnie E. Simpson signed
the contract on behalf of Debco. The contract incorporated Debco's unit price bid in the amount
of $6,531,483.40. Copies of contract pages CA-1 (entitled "CONTRACT AGREEMENT") and
CA-2 (signature page) are included within the Complaint as Exhibit B. (R. 000030 - 000031).
The contract also incorporates ITD's 2004 Standard Specifications for Highway Construction.
The Standard Specifications booklet is a sizeable document which addresses numerous aspects of
contracting and construction.
Of relevance for ITD's Complaint and this appeal is Standard Specification 105.17. See
Complaint at Exhibit C. (R. 000033 - 000040). As can be seen, the provision is titled "Claims
for Adjustment and Disputes," and it contains the following subheadings:
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS (page 33);
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (page 33);
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GENERAL (page 38);
AUDITS (page 38); and
BINDING ARBITRATION (page 40).
Standard Specification 105.17 provides ITD with the opportunity to resolve claims via an
administrative claims process prior to being subjected to a binding arbitration proceeding. Under
this provision, the administrative claim process begins with an ITD Resident Engineer who has
90 days after receipt of a documented claim to analyze and make a decision.

See

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS entry on pages 33-37 of the Complaint's Exhibit C. (R. 000033
- 000037).
If a contractor is not satisfied, however, it may appeal a Resident Engineer's decision to

ITD's Chief Engineer.

See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS entry at pages 37-38 (again at

Exhibit C) (R. 000037 - 000038). This provision requires a decision from the Chief Engineer
within 90 days after the Chief Engineer receives a documented claim appeal. Most claims are
resolved at the Resident Engineer or Chief Engineer level.
If a contractor remains unsatisfied, however, it can then demand arbitration:
If the Contractor is to make a demand for arbitration, it must be

made within 120 days of the date of the Chief Engineer's decision,
otherwise the Chief Engineer's decision shall be final and
conclusive.
See Complaint at Exhibit C, BINDING ARBITRATION entry at page 40 (last paragraph). (R.

000040).
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Arbitration is only available, however, after completion of the preceding administrative
claims process:
The Contractor shall exhaust the Administrative Process for resolution, unless the
Contractor and the Department agree that claims that have not been resolved
through the Administrative Process provided in this section shall be resolved
through binding arbitration. The Contractor and the Department may agree on an
arbitration process, or, if the Contractor and the Department cannot agree,
arbitration shall be administered through the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) using the following arbitration methods:
[References Expedited or Standard AAA provisions depending on the claim
amount.]
The Department and Contractor agree that any arbitration hearing shall be
conducted in Boise, Idaho.
The Contractor and the Department agree to be bound by the decision of the
binding arbitration, and the judgment rendered by the arbitrator(s). The decision
of the arbitrator(s) and the specific basis for the decision shall be in writing. The
arbitrator(s) shall use the contract as a basis for the decision.
Unless the Contractor and the Department agree, all unresolved claims and
disputes which arise from the contract, must be brought in a single arbitration
hearing.
See BINDING ARBITRATION entry on page 40 (Exhibit C). (R. 000040).

Separate from the administrative claims process, the Standard Specifications allow the
Parties to retain a technical expert to make non-binding recommendations. Further, the contract
allows the Parties to potentially avoid a formal claim via a Dispute Resolution Board. The
Dispute Resolution Board is also specified as being a non-binding process.
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2. Debco Filed An Arbitration Demand The Very Next Day After Submitting Its
Claim
During the Washington Street project and thereafter, Appellant ITD agreed to contract
adjustments that increased the amount actually paid to Respondent Debco to approximately $8.4
million. Prior to October 28, 2013, the Parties were engaged in non-binding efforts to address
Debee's additional payment adjustment requests (over and above the approximately $1.9 million
that had already been provided in excess of Debee's unit price bid). These efforts included both
a technical expert recommendation and an initial hearing before a Dispute Resolution Board. In
accordance with the contract, ITD participated in good faith, but never agreed that either effort
was anything but non-binding.
Debco submitted its initial claim to ITD on October 28, 2013.

That document

accompanies the Complaint as Exhibit E. (R. 000048 - 000050). This submission commenced
the administrative claims review process.

The very next day, October 29, 2013, Debco

submitted a demand for arbitration to the American Arbitration Association (hereafter "AAA").
See Complaint at Exhibit F (this is a large document with multiple appendices and its own

exhibits). (R. 000052 - 000107). The arbitration demand acknowledged that Debco had not
exhausted the administrative claims process.

ITD never agreed to any waiver of the

administrative claims process.
ITD's initial participation in the arbitration process was to object to arbitration timing and
to avoid potential waiver. Such forced participation did not negate the need for the declaratory
relief that was later requested from the district court.
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3. ITD Needed To Stay The Arbitration Proceeding
Appellant ITD objected to Respondent's arbitration demand because Debco failed to
exhaust the administrative claims process, and because ITD was not given the opportunity to
address and/or resolve claims prior to arbitration commencing. To avoid any waiver pursuant to
the AAA arbitration rules, ITD formally made such objections to AAA.

See Complaint at

Exhibit G. (R. 000109 - 000129). Notwithstanding ITD's objection, AAA stated: "Absent
mutual agreement or court order, the Association shall proceed with the administration of this
matter."

See AAA's November 22, 2013 e-mail attached to the Complaint as Exhibit H

(emphasis added). (R. 000131). AAA proceeded with the empaneling of an arbitration panel,
which meant that ITD was faced with initial upfront arbitration costs.
Respondent Debco opposed ITD's request to hold arbitration in abeyance. See e-mail
from Debco's attorney attached to the Complaint as Exhibit I.

(R. 000133). Debco further

submitted a motion to AAA asking that an arbitration hearing be promptly scheduled. See
Debco's December 2, 2013 motion attached to the Complaint as Exhibit J.

(R. 000135 -

000138).
Because Debco failed to exhaust the administrative claims process prior to demanding
arbitration, and because ITD was precluded from addressing and/or resolving formal claims prior
to commencement of arbitration, ITD felt obligated to enforce the contract provisions pertaining
to the administrative claims process. By so doing, ITD hoped to preclude inefficiency, avoid
undue waste of public funds and resources, and prevent Debco from benefitting via certain
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contract aspects that it liked (binding arbitration) while 1gnonng prov1s10ns that it found
inconvenient (claims process).
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court err in granting Respondent Debee's 12(b)(6) Motion to
Dismiss?

2.

Is Appellant ITD, as a State of Idaho governmental entity, entitled to enforce its
administrative claims process by seeking declaratory and/or injunctive relief from
the courts?

3.

Did the district court err in awarding costs and fees to Respondent?
III.

ARGUMENT
A.

THIS COURT'S 2010 DECISION IN LAUGHY V. ITD PRECLUDED
JURISDICTION IN A POST-CLAIMS FORUM UNLESS AND UNTIL
THE PARTIES COMPLIED WITH REQUIRED ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES

Laughy v. Idaho Transportation Department, 149 Idaho 867, 243 P.3d 1055 (2010)
involved "overlegal" permits that ITD was considering to allow the transportation of so-called
mega-loads across the U.S. Highway 12 corridor in northern Idaho. Rather than participating in
the administrative permitting process, the Laughy plaintiffs attempted to bypass that procedure
and proceed directly to district court. 149 Idaho at 869. The district court acted on the plaintiffs'
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petition and reversed ITD's decision to issue the permits. Id ITD and the owner of the load,
ConocoPhillips, appealed the district court decision to this Court.
On appeal, ITD argued that the district court reached the wrong result. ITD maintained
that the large loads would not impact the infrastructure of the state highways, and that more than
adequate measures had been developed to protect the safety and convenience of the general
public.
However, this Court found that neither the district court nor the Supreme Court had
jurisdiction to consider the matter. Id at 876. The Court determined that the permit issued by
ITD constituted an "order" as that term is defined by the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act
(IAP A). Id. at 871-72. The permit issued by ITD was the result of an informal disposition of a
contested case. The Court specifically noted that Idaho Code § 67-5241 (1 )( c ), part of the IAP A,
"represents a conscious legislative effort to 'encourage informal dispute resolution' related to all
kinds of agency action. Id. at 872. The Court further determined that the parties to the informal
procedures "cannot unilaterally decide to utilize informal procedures to the exclusion of formal
proceedings. 'Unless all parties agree to the contrary in writing, informal proceedings do not
substitute for formal proceedings and do not exhaust administrative remedies ... "' Id at 872,
citing ID APA 04.11.01.103. The Court remanded the matter because ITD had not issued a final
order under the IAP A and therefore jurisdiction for judicial review was not yet appropriate. Id.
at 874. Subsequently, ITD conducted a hearing under the formal contested case provisions of the
IAPA.
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Simply put, the Laughy plaintiffs' avoidance of the required administrative process
precluded the pursuit of subsequent review.

According to the Court, "This rule [requiring

participation in and exhaustion of the administrative process] prevents anyone from doing what
Respondents [Laughy] did here: sit out the agency proceedings, show up in court just as a
decision is made, and force the agency to litigate the matter." Id. at 876.
The underlying considerations in Laughy are the same as in the present matter.

A

construction claim filed by a contractor, such as Respondent Debco, involves an administrative
process in which ITD determines the rights of the parties. As this Court noted in Laughy, a twostep analysis applies in determining whether an agency action constitutes an "order" under the
IAPA. Id. at 871, citing Westway Constr., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep 't, 139 Idaho 107, 112, 73
P.3d 721, 726 (2003).
First to have an order, the Legislature must have empowered the agency to determine the
particular issue. Here the Legislature has specifically provided the Idaho Transportation Board
and its Department with the authority "To contract fully, in the name of the state of Idaho, with
respect to the rights, powers and duties vested in the board by this title." Idaho Code § 40-309.
One of the duties of the Idaho Transportation Board listed in Title 40 of the Idaho Code is to
"Locate, design, construct, reconstruct, alter, extend, repair and maintain state highways and
plan, design and develop statewide transportation systems." Idaho Code § 40-310(4).

The

highway construction contract between ITD and Respondent Debco falls squarely within the
authority granted to the Board and Department by the Legislature.
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Additionally, the Legislature provided the Transportation Board with the authority to
prescribe rules and regulations affecting state highway projects and to enforce those rules. Idaho
Code § 40-312(1).

Accordingly, ITD adopted Standard Specifications for Highway

Construction, which ITD updates periodically. The Standard Specifications are part of every
highway construction contract. In regards to the Debco contract, section 105.17 of the 2004
Standard Specifications states: "The Contractor shall exhaust the Administrative Process for
resolution, unless the Contractor and the Department agree that claims that have not been
resolved through the Administrative Process provided in this section, shall be resolved through
binding arbitration." (R. 000040). In short, ITD has been authorized by the Legislature, and has
in fact established an administrative process to resolve construction contract disputes.
Second, Laughy says that an agency action will be deemed an "order" if the agency
action determines "the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one
or more persons." Id. at 871, citing Westway Constr., 139 Idaho at 112, 73 P.3d at 726. As
discussed above, the administrative process is to determine the rights of the parties under the
construction contract.
Respondent Debco initiated the administrative process. However, the next day, without
waiting for the administrative appeal to proceed (or even really commence), Debco filed a claim
with the AAA and initiated binding arbitration. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies in
this case is analogous to the failure of Mr. Laughy to exhaust his administrative remedies
relevant to the permit issued by ITD.
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An entity should not be allowed to bypass the administrative process and force the
Department to move directly into litigation or arbitration. That is what Debco Construction
attempted to do, and that is why ITD was justified in seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
According to Laughy, the AAA arbitration panel would not have jurisdiction unless and until the
administrative claims process was completed.

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT MISAPPLIED THIS COURT'S RULINGS IN
STOREY CONSTRUCTION V. HANKS

Despite the duty to exhaust its available administrative remedies, Respondent Debco
asserts that this Court's decision in other arbitration cases authorizes a premature filing with the
AAA. Debco pulled select language from Storey Construction, Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401,
224 P.3d 468 (2009), to suggest that the district court ought to ignore Debee's disregard of the
contractual claims process.
Storey Construction presents rather unique circumstances. In Storey Construction, the
parties had participated in a prior arbitration back in 2003, and the arbitrators had ruled
substantially in favor of Storey Construction. Then in 2007, the trustee for Hanks initiated
another round of arbitration, asserting claims that were allegedly unknown back in 2003. Storey
Construction opposed such via district court on the basis of res judicata. The district court
concluded that the 2007 claims were barred because of the 2003 arbitration. The Idaho Supreme
Court reversed. Of note, both the district court and the Supreme Court looked extensively at the
parties' agreement to arbitrate and sought to decipher whether the parties had submitted the
specific claims to arbitration. This Court found:
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"Matters submitted for arbitration are relevant to determining the scope of an
arbitrator's power and must be considered along with the original agreement to
arbitrate." Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 816, 118 P.3d 141, 148
(2005) (citations omitted). "Arbitrators are, of course, not free to disregard the
terms of the contracts they are reviewing-their powers derive from the parties'
agreement." Mumford v. Miller, 143 Idaho 99, 101, 137 P.3d 1021, 1023 (2006).
Arbitrators would exceed their powers if they "considered an issue not submitted
to him by the parties, or exceeded the bounds of the contract between the parties."
Bingham County Com'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., a Div. of the L.E. Myers Co., 105
Idaho 36, 42, 665 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1983) ....
As stated above, the contract required that any claim first be submitted to the
architect. A claim submitted to the architect was "subject to arbitration" only
after either a decision by the architect or the expiration of thirty days after it had
been submitted to the architect. Obviously, unknown claims could not be
submitted to the architect and, under the parties' agreement, were therefore not
"subject to arbitration." Consequently, the prior arbitration proceedings could not
have resolved claims, as defined in the contract, that were unknown or that had
not been submitted to arbitration.
148 Idaho at 408-09, 224 P.3d at 475-76 (emphasis added).
Herein, the Supreme Court acknowledges the limitations placed by the parties on matters
submitted to arbitration: Such were not "subject to arbitration" unless and until the claims were
first addressed by the architect. Since the new Hanks' claims were not submitted to the architect
back in 2003, they could not then have been "submitted to arbitration." Given the previous
arbitration context, Storey Construction (who had been successful in 2003) was required to go
back to an arbitration panel for the 2007 claims.
Respondent Debco pointed to language of the Court issued in determination of a
subsequent motion (Storey Construction had raised the issue again with the Supreme Court via a
petition for rehearing). In that context, this Court made it clear that it would not entertain the
matter further and emphasized that it would defer to the arbitrators in that particular instance:
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"Arbitrability is a question of law to be decided by the court." Mason v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197, 200, 177 P.3d 944, 947 (2007).
However, courts, including this Court, have limited the scope of the question of
arbitrability. The vast majority have held that issues of procedural arbitrability,
such as whether conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate have been met,
are for the arbitrators to decide.
148 Idaho at 412, 224 P.3d at 479.
The Supreme Court's ruling in the Storey Construction case makes sense given the prior
arbitration and the potential relation between the 2003 and 2007 claims. Nevertheless, this
language is offset by the Supreme Court's clear recognition of the courts' role in reviewing the
parties' contract, and in precluding arbitrators from overreaching by considering matters that
were not "submitted to arbitration."
In the present matter, there was no prior arbitration like in Storey Construction.
Additionally, this is not a dispute between private parties. This is a dispute involving the state of
Idaho and its ability to resolve the dispute as a contested case under the IAP A. As a result, there
are claims that cannot now be "subject to litigation" unless and until Debco complied with its
statutory and contractual obligation to complete the administrative claims process. As explained
above, this is not merely a contractual "condition precedent" as the term appears to be used in

Storey Construction.
ITD is not simply raising a potential or hypothetical issue in this case. After Debco filed
for arbitration, ITD filed a motion with AAA to stay the arbitration proceedings. ITD received
notices from AAA in return stating it would nonetheless proceed and form an arbitration panel.
(R. 000131 ). ITD subsequently received notice from AAA that an initial $1700 was due from
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ITD as a deposit toward the costs of the arbitration proceedings. (R. 000319 - 000323). Given
AAA's statements and stance, ITD was relegated to file a declaratory judgment action with the
district court so as to seek a stay of the arbitration. ITD had not been given a full opportunity to
receive information from Debco or to review and determine the dispute.
Ultimately, the arbitration panel addressed the issue, in part, after ITD filed a declaratory
judgment action. The arbitration panel agreed to delay scheduling the arbitration so as to allow
ITD additional time to pursue an informal contested case procedure.

C.

AT THE TIME THE DEPARTMENT FILED SUIT, AAA HAD MADE IT
CLEAR THAT A COURT ORDER WOULD BE REQUIRED TO STAY
ARBITRATION

On November 22, 2013, AAA representative Mike Powell sent an e-mail to the parties
which stated: "Absent mutual agreement or court order, the Association shall proceed with the
administration of this matter." (R. 000131) (emphasis added). Debco had previously rebuffed
all ITD requests for a "mutual agreement" to stay arbitration.

ITD, therefore, reasonably

believed-in accordance with the AAA directive-that a "court order" was invited and necessary
so as to stay the AAA proceeding.
ITD's Complaint, filed on December 10, 2013, was in response to AAA's explicit
statement about pursuing a court order.

In the weeks subsequent to ITD's filing suit, the

arbitration process moved forward quickly, while the district court proceeding progressed more
slowly. During this time period, ITD consistently asserted that it objected to participation in the
AAA procedure, but did participate so as to avoid potential waiver.
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On January 23, 2014, AAA scheduled a preliminary hearing (for February 5, 2014) and
requested initial payment from the parties (by or before January 31, 2014). In response, ITD
filed motions on January 27, 2014 for a TRO and preliminary injunction (ITD's efforts continued
to be in accordance with the AAA statements about court intervention). In its January 28, 2014
TRO opposition, Debco asserted to the court that it had paid both parties' AAA fees. On January
30, 2014 the district court concluded that Debco's payment removed pending harm and so the
court declined to issue a TRO (the preliminary injunction hearing was scheduled for February
10, 2014).
The AAA preliminary hearing did occur on February 5, 2014, and the panel declined to
schedule a full arbitration hearing to consider the actual merits of Debco's claim. This was
exactly what ITD was seeking-adequate delay in the arbitration process so as to allow
completion of the contractual claims review process. Granted the requested time by AAA, ITD
withdrew its February 10th motion for preliminary injunction.
Debco immediately informed the district court about the AAA's delay in arbitration
scheduling via a Third Affidavit of Ron T. Blewett. (R. 000433 - 000435). With the recognition
that ITD had obtained what it was ultimately pursuing, the district court erroneously disregarded
AAA's statements about a court order, and granted Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal in favor of Debco.
Unlike the district court, ITD did not have February 2014 hindsight at the time the Department
filed its Complaint. Of course, had the AAA proceeded as Debco was requesting, ITD would
have been left in an untenable position (although the district court may have ruled differently if
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AAA had declined to postpone arbitration scheduling). This Court should reverse the district
court's erroneous disregard of AAA's "court order" statements.
D.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ITO'S COMPLAINT
PRIOR TO A FULL RULE 56 SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING

In support of its motions for summary judgment and Rule 12(b)( 6) dismissal, Respondent
Debco submitted a combined supporting brief, numerous affidavits, and other provided items
that exceeded the provisions of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. The district court clearly reviewed at
least some of these items, and in at least one instance the court acknowledged that such was
taken into consideration. See Third Affidavit of Ron T. Blewett Regarding AAA Scheduling
Hearing (R. 000433 - 000435) and the district court's references within the Transcript on Appeal
(Tr. p. 27, L. 5-7 and p. 29, L. 7-11). The district court's statements include:
I did see with respect to the last affidavit what the current posture is or alleged to
be of the arbitration itself [i.e., the decision by the AAA panel to postpone any
scheduling of an ultimate arbitration proceeding].

***
And I think that the motions are best in terms of requiring the plaintiff to - pardon
me, the defendant to comply with the conditions precedent are ones that should be
brought to the arbitration, and it sounds like they have been [again recognizing
that the affidavit apprised the district court about the AAA panel's scheduling
postponement].
Tr. p. 27, L. 5-7 and p. 29, L. 7-11. (Emphasis added; bracketed explanations added).
Notwithstanding the district court's assertion that the affidavits and additional
information were set aside for purposes of its Rule l 2(b)( 6) consideration, Appellant ITD asserts
that the lower court's acknowledgment and use of such items demonstrates that dismissal should
have at least waited until a Rule 56 Summary Judgment hearing.
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As this Court is aware, Civil Rule 12(b) states:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for

failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
I.R.C.P. 12(b) (emphasis added).
Even if the district court set aside the submitted affidavits (which, as indicated, it did not
consistently do), such affidavits were explicitly relied on throughout the combined brief. See, for
example, the "Undisputed Facts" at

,r,r

4, 5, 6 and 7; the "Argument" at part b.; and the

"Argument" at subpart v. of part c. (R. 000297 - 000302). Further, such information and ideas
were entwined throughout the remaining arguments and submitted materials.
In addition, the briefing before the district court contained random statements that, while
not supported by affidavit, clearly make assertions which are outside the presented pleadings. As
such, it was difficult to decipher what aspects were intended for the motion to dismiss versus
what was being delayed until summary judgment. ITD again asserts that it should have been
given a full opportunity to provide affidavits and other evidence pursuant to a Rule 56 objection.
Although the district court no doubt made a good faith effort, it seems likely that the abundant
information derived from outside the pleadings did play a part in the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
considerations.
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E.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ITO'S COMPLAINT
VIA CIVIL RULE 12(b)(6)

Numerous Idaho court decisions emphasize the significant burden required of a defendant
via a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. For example:
Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989): The
nonmoving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record viewed in its
favor, and only then may the question be asked whether a claim for relief has been
stated.
Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Ct. App. 1992): A
court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) only "when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of [the] claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief." It need
not appear that the plaintiff can obtain the particular relief prayed for, as long as
the court can ascertain that some relief may be granted.
Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962-963, 895 P.2d 561, 563-564
(1995): We cannot say based upon the general allegations in the complaint, that
there was no conceivable set of facts which would have entitled Orthman to relief
... it was error to hold that the pleading was insufficient to allege a duty and
breach of duty causing injuries.

Appellant ITD presented both statutory and contractual basis for its requested relief: See
the Complaint's citations to Idaho Code § 7-902 and § 10-1201 et seq, as well as the specific
contract provision regarding the administrative claims process (Standard Specification 105.17).
(R. 000005 - 000010) and (R. 000033 - 000040). Respondent Debco's briefing in support of

dismissal was replete with inferences that lean to its favor-but those should not have been used
by the district court as any basis for the motion to dismiss. In accordance with the cited case
law, Appellant asserts that with even the most minimal of favorable inferences and a cursory
consideration of conceivable facts, it is clear that ITD made a viable claim for relief.
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Accordingly, the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss because Debco failed to
meet its difficult burden specified by the Civil Rule and Idaho case law.
F.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED FEES AND COSTS
TO RESPONDENT DEBCO

The district court misread applicable precedent and erroneously granted an award of
attorneys' fees to the Respondent. Appellant ITD respectfully asks that this Court reverse such
award, and determine that Respondent is owed no attorneys' fees or discretionary costs.
1. Respondent Is Not Entitled to Fees Under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3)
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides as follows:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated,
note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to
the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and
in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law,
the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to
be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
I.C. § 12-120(3) (emphasis added).
ITD's Complaint, limited to a request for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief,
did not constitute an action to recover on a commercial transaction. Hence, I. C. § 12-120(3) is
inapplicable and provides no basis for awarding attorney's fees.
In considering I. C. § 12-120(3 ), Idaho courts have recognized that the provision does not
provide a basis to award fees in cases where there is no effort to pursue recovery via a
commercial transaction:

Black Diamond Alliance, LLC v. Kimball, 148 Idaho 798, 801-802, 229 P.3d
1160, 1163-1164 (2010) (one party sought to recover fees because of "the nature
of the underlying commercial transaction"; however, "This Court declines to
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award attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3) because this was not an
action to recover on a commercial transaction.").
PHH Mortgage Services Corp, v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 641, 200 P.3d 1180,
1190 (2009) ("This case was brought by PHH to eject the Perreiras and Anestos
from their residence, and the Perreiras counterclaim sought to contest the
foreclosure sale of their residence. This was not an action to recover in a
commercial transaction.").
Brower v. El. DuPont De Nemours and Company, 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d
345, 349 (1990) ("These cases [five cases cited and previously discussed in
Brower,'] lead to the conclusion that the award of attorney's fees is not warranted
every time a commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather,
the test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the
lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.C. § 12-120(3) unless the
commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon
which the party is attempting to recover. To hold otherwise would be to convert
the award of attorney's fees from an exceptional remedy justified only by
statutory authority to a matter ofright in virtually every lawsuit filed.").

Bracketed explanation and underlined emphasis added.
As in the cited cases, ITD's action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief did not
constitute an action to recover in a commercial transaction. This is in accord with Respondent's
initial memorandum of costs, which acknowledged: "The gravamen of plaintiffs complaint was
to stay arbitration under the Uniform Arbitration Act .... " See Memorandum at page 2. (R.
000473). As such, this contrasts with the requirements and intent of LC. § 12-120(3), which
applies only when a complaint seeks recovery via a commercial dispute.
The district court's application of I.C. § 12-120(3) would modify "an exceptional remedy
justified only by statutory authority to a matter of right in virtually every lawsuit filed." See
Brower, 117 Idaho at 784, 792 P.2d at 349.
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2. Respondent is Not Entitled to Fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117
Respondent is not entitled to attorney fees or discretionary costs under Idaho Code § 12117. This statute states in part:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency,
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal,
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.
Idaho Code § 12-117 (underlined emphasis added).
This Court has frequently determined that a state agency, even if it is judged to be
mistaken in its course of action, was not acting without a reasonable basis in fact or law so as to
give rise to an award of costs or fees. For example:
Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673, 678, 978 P.2d 233, 238
(1999) (although the State lost a quiet title action, "we cannot conclude that the
State acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law in defending this action.").
Henderson v. Eclipse Traffic Control and Flagging, Inc., 147 Idaho 628, 635, 213
P.3d 718, 725 (2009) ("Henderson is not entitled to fees under this statute [I.C. §
12-117]. Although Henderson is the prevailing party, she is not entitled to fees
because she has failed to show that the Department [of Commerce and Labor]
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.").
State, Department of Finance v. Resource Service Co., Inc., 134 Idaho 282, 285, 1
P.3d 783, 786 (2000) (despite a previous ruling by the Idaho Supreme Court
requiring that the Department of Finance's complaint be dismissed, fees were not
awarded because "the Department was not without a reasonable basis in fact or
law in bringing and maintaining suit against RSC for violation of the Idaho
Securities Act.").
McCoy v. State, Department of Health and Welfare, 127 Idaho 792, 797, 907 P.2d
110, 115( 1995) ("Although the Department's justification for denying coverage
was in error for the reasons stated in this opinion, its defense of this position was
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certainly not so unreasonable as to justify the imposition of attorney fees under
IC.§ 12-117.").
In the present matter, ITD acted with good faith and reasonableness comparable to that
reflected in the above cases.

Accordingly, Respondent is not entitled to attorneys' fees or

discretionary costs.
IV.
CONCLUSION

The district court misread and misapplied this Court's prior cases dealing with arbitration
and the respective roles of courts and arbitrators. In doing so, the district court precluded the
Transportation Department from enforcing its administrative claims process. In addition, the
district court acted contrary to the instructions of this Court regarding the use of and deference to
informal procedures to resolve a contested matter. The declaratory and injunctive relief sought
by ITD was necessary and just, and the Department at all times acted reasonably in its efforts to
sustain its contract and claims procedures. ITD respectfully asks that this Court reverse the
district court's grant of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, as well as the award of attorneys' fees and
discretionary costs.
DATED this 15 th day of August, 2014.

G~~

Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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